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ABSTRACT 
Arlo D. Hendrickson 
435 words 
Payoffs to Probability Forecasters 
A payoff f(p) is defined to be a function whose domain 
consists of densities with respect to a measure µ on a measure 
space (X, a) and whose range is a class of random variables on 
(X, a). The value of a payoff f(p) after the outcome we l is 
observed is the payment given to a forecaster for his appraisal 
p of the true density p. A desirable property of a payoff 
function is that the maximum expectation be attained under a given 
density p when p = p. This property is said to "keep the 
forecaster honest." 
A theorem of McCarthy (1956) on payoff functions which keep 
the forecaster honest is corrected by a slight modification and is 
generalized to a Hilbert space H, which is taken to be a closed 
subspace of ~(µ). If both the domain P and the range of f 
are subsets of H, then the expe~tation H(p) = E(f(p)lp) is 
the usual inner product < p, f(p) >. By generalizing Rockafellar's 
finite dimensional definition of subgradient, the condition for 
encouraging honesty becomes equivalent to the condition that the 
expectation function H(p) have a subgradient f(p) at each point 
p e P. The class of continuous, convex and homogeneous functions 
on the cone (Ap: pc P, A> 0) are among the class of expectation 
functions of payoff rules which encourage honesty. 
Payoff functions are also studied from the point of view of 
offering a forecaster a choice of several random variables without 
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asking him to disclose his evaluation of the density. The class 
C of choices is assumed to be closed and convex. There is a one-
to-one correspondence between closed convex sets C and expectation 
functions H of honesty encouraging payoff rules f. H is 
characterized as being a support function of C where p is normal 
to C at f(p) for all p e P. 
A sequential procedure is developed to obtain the forecaster's 
undisclosed probability p = P(A). Let 1 rl = 2· At the k~ stage 
the forecaster is offered his choice between the payoff g(pk) if 
an event Bk of probability pk occurs. If the payoff when A 
. -k-1 
,occurs is chosen then pk+l = pk+ 2 • -k-1 Otherwise pk+l = pk- 2 • 
It is assumed that the forecaster makes his decision such that 
( -k -k Pe pk- 2 , p~+ 2 ) for all k. To ensure this we let p = lim pk 
k-+ 00 
and ask that g be such that the forecaster's cumulated payoff 
f(p) encourages honesty. Necessary and sufficient conditions on 
g are given to encourage honesty at either time n or in the 
limit as n ~ co. One solution is given by g(2-n) = 2-n and 
g(~) = 2•4• •.• k-3) k-1) 
2n 3•5• ••• k-2 k 
2-n for k = 3, 5' .•. , -n· 2 - 1, and 
n = 1, 2, ••• 
- 2 -
~ 
~ 
., 
i 
u-
-
~ 
-
L-
.... 
LJ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
L.. 
w 
u 
i..J 
... 
w 
I.I 
I I 
~ 
~ 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
...i 
- l -
&AUOS 
OJ. 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
. n 
-:,.. ~· 
~ 
.!, 'Iv n ~ 
' 
ACKNOO..EDGEMENTS 
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the invaluable help provided 
by others. 
I owe many thanks to Professor R. J. Buehler under whose 
excellent guidance this thesis was written. Professor Buehler 
provided uruch of the literature on payoffs and suggested the 
problems of generalizing McCarthy's Theorem and of developing 
an honesty encouraging sequential procedure. Professor Buehler 
offered much encouragement and gave many suggestions which 
considerably improved this thesis. 
I would like to thank the National Science Foundation for their 
financial assistance under the research grant GP-9556. I would 
also like to thank the U. s. Bureau of Mines, Twin Cities Mining 
Research Center with whom I was empl6yed part time while completing 
research on this thesis. 
I am grateful to Mr. Gerry OuChaine who typed this thesis. 
Mr. DuChaine's ability as a math typist made proofreading easy 
and expedited the final typed draft of this thesis. 
Finally I extend warm thanks to the Statistics Faculty of the 
University of Minnesota under whom I spent many fulfilling hours 
as a student and who contributed indirectly to this thesis. 
- ii -
<I>; 
u 
I 
I.I 
I 
I 
~ 
I : 
~-
I 
I.al 
I 
u 
... 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I: Introduction 
1. Background ...........••................... .- ....... . 
Page 
1 
2. Suouna.ry .••••.•••.....•. ·• . • • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
CHAPTER II: Honesty Encouraging Payoff Functions and a 
Theorem of McCarthy 
1. Introduction .......... ~ ........................... . 8 
2. Payoff functions •••••• ~. • • • . • . . • • • . . . • . . • • • • • • . . . • . 9 
3. P as a convex subset of a Hilbert space •.••••...•• 11 
4. Review of some concepts of convex analysis ••••••.•• 12 
5. McCarthy's theorem • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • . . • • • • • • . . . • . • 19 
CHAPTER III: Support Functions 
1. Introduction ....................................... 28 
2. Support functions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . . • . • • . . . . • 29 
CHAPTER IV: Some Sequential Procedures Which Encourage 
Honesty 
1. Introduction ....................................... 37 
2. Description of the procedure ••••••••••••••••••••••• 38 
3. 
4. 
Expressions for expected payoff 
Payoffs which encourage honesty 
functions •••••••••• 
.................... 
39 
42 
5. Properties of cumulated honesty encouraging payoffs. 44 
6. Properties of payoffs which encourage honesty •••••• 48 
7. Payoffs which encourage honesty in the limit .•....• 51 
CHAPTER V: Miscellaneous Related Problems 
1. 
2. 
Consensus functions 
Other properties of payoffs ....................... . 
- iii -
59 
61 
~ Ll ~ ~ 
~ 
., - 0 
3. Undominated classes of probability measures ••••..•• 63 
4. Symmetrical sequential payoffs ••••••••••••••••••••• 64 0 
REFERENCES .................................................. 67 --u 
~- i 
! l u 
0 
-
I I I I i..i 
. I L 
0 
0 
u 
0 
!( 
u 
-u 
-u 
0 
u 
-u 
- iv - Ll 
-- CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
1. Background. 
Suppose a forecaster has knowledge of a probability measure, 
unknown to others, for a given measure space. It is not essential 
to this paper whether the forecaster's probability is subjective 
or is an estimate of a unique probability measure defined by a 
frequency interpretation. A forecaster's client would want the 
forecaster to be honest when giving his subjective probability, 
or to be accurate when assessing the true probability. The client 
can encourage honesty or provide incentive for accuracy by giving 
the forecaster a payoff which depends on both the forecaster's 
disclosed probability and on the outcome of the experiment we X. 
The class of such "payoffs which encourage honesty" will be studied 
in Chapter II. 
Related to payoff functions which encourage honesty is the 
concept of score functions for forecasters which encourage accurate 
prediction, first suggested by Brier (1950). If E1 , E2 , ••• , Er 
are r disjoint, exhaustive outcomes of any given trial of an 
experiment; and if pij is the probability given by a forecaster 
for the event Ei at the jth trial, then Brier suggested the 
score 
where is the indicator function for the event E. 
l 
at the 
jth trial, and n is the number of trials. The score p is 
- 1 -
minimized when the prediction is "perfect," whe~ pij = v1r 
If we take n = 1, negate P, and add the constant 1, we obtain the 
r 
quadratic payoff, 2pk - ~ p :i_2 if the event Ek occurs. This 
i=l 
payoff function, suggested by de Finetti (1962) is known to 
satisfy the property of encouraging honesty, which we will define 
below. Brier did not consider the expectation of his score. 
Good (1952), in a section titled "fair fees," raised the 
question of "how a firm can encourage its experts to give fair 
estimates of probabilities." If E was an event whose probability 
was estimated to be p1 by an expert, then Good suggested paying 
the expert k log (2p1) if E occurred and k log (2-2p1) if E 
did not occur. This payoff function had the "desirable property 
that its expectation is maximized when p1 = p, the true probability 
of E." Good (1970) has stated that a more appropriate term for 
"fair fees" would ~ave been "accuracy incentive fees." 
McCarthy (1956) generalized Good's problem from the case of 
two possible outcomes to that of n outcomes whose probabilities 
were to be estimated by a forecaster. A forecaster was to be paid 
a payoff fk(q) if the kth event occurred where q = (q1 , q2 , ••• , qn) 
was the forecaster's estimate of the true probability vector 
p = (p1 , p2 , ••• , pn). McCarthy defined a payoff rule which "keeps 
the forecaster honest" to be a rule such that "regardless of the 
value of p, the forecaster's expectation is maximized if and only 
if he puts q = p." In this paper we will call such functions 
"payoff functions which strictly encourage honesty." We reserve 
- 2 -
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the name "payoff functions which encourage honesty" for payoff 
functions which satisfy the less restrictive condition that the 
forecaster's expectation is maximized at q = p and possibly 
other values of q. At least this condition does not discourage 
honesty, although it may not provide incentive for collecting 
more evidence. 
Several authors have studied the properties of payoff functions 
which encourage honesty. Aczel and Pfanzagl (1965) obtained the 
interesting result that with n > 2 outcomes, the logarithmic 
payoff, A log pk+ B, is the only function which both strictly encourages 
honesty and has the property that the payoff for the occurrence of 
the kth event depends only on the estimated probability pk of 
that event. They give more general solutions for n = 2. For other 
more or less independent discussions of this same result see 
McCarthy (1956), Marschak (1960), Shuford et al (1966), de Finetti 
and Savage (1969), and Good (1970). 
Denote by H(r, p) the expected payoff to an appraiser for 
his appriasal of the true probability vector p as being r. De 
Finetti and Savage (1969) have shown the condition that the loss 
function L(r, p) = H(p; p) - H(r, p) be dependent only on r - p 
is equivalent to the condition that H(p, p) be quadratic, and 
this is equivalent to the condition that L(r; p) = L(p; r). 
The most general theorem on payoffs which encourage honesty 
seems to be McCarthy's (1956) in which he gives necessary and 
sufficient conditions in the finite discrete case. He omitted the 
- 3 -
proof. McCarthy's theorem can be interpreted as follows: A 
random variable f(p) = {f1(p), f2(p), ••• , fn(p)) keeps the 
at{ forecaster honest iff fk(p) = op {p) where H is a convex 
k 
function which is homogeneous of the first degree. The function 
H is the maximum expectation function 
n 
H(p) = ~ pkfk(p). 
k=l 
McCarthy's theorem needs a slight modification to be correct, as 
we show in Chapter II. 
Buehler (1970) gave examples of payoff functions where the 
domain was the set of density functions with respect to Lebesgue 
measure. Buehler posed the problem of paralleling the results of 
McCarthy's theorem for the Euclidean case with a theorem for the 
space of density functions. 
Marschak (1960) in his comments on McCarthy's paper noted the 
distinction between functions which are "expected costs to the 
client" to provide incentive for honest appraisals by the expert 
and functions which are "a good measure of worth to the client 
to be given these probabilities." However, although the two measures 
may be different, according to McCarthy's theorem the former is 
restricted only to be convex {because any function which is convex 
n 
on {(p1 , p2 , ••• , pn): ~ pk= 1, pk 2: 0 for all k} can be k=l 
extended uniquely to a homogeneous and convex function on the 
Euclidean space Rn). Thus if the second measure is restricted 
to be convex, then by an appropriate choice of the payoff function, 
the two measures of worth and cost can be made equal. 
- 4 -
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We quote from McCarthy (1956) the intuitive concept of the 
convexity restriction on the maximum expected payoff function H: 
The intuitive concept of the convexity restriction 
is that it is always a good idea to look at the outcome 
of an experiment if it is free. For suppose that the 
experiment has two outcomes, A and A*, which would give 
one probabilities p and p* for the event in question. 
Let t be the probability that A is the outcome. If 
we decide not to look, our expectation is H{tp + (1-t)p*), 
while if we decide to look, our expectation is tH(p) + 
(1-t)H(p*). 
The payoff to a forecaster for his evaluation of p can be 
studied from a different viewpoint. Rather than paying a fore-
caster for disclosing a probability density, a client can offer 
the forecaster a choice of several random variables whose values 
depend on the outcome of the experiment we X. The forecaster's 
choice should yield information about his undisclosed evaluation 
of p. Several choices can be offered sequentially. The set of 
choices at eadh stage may depend on previous choices, and each 
particular choice may yield more information about the forecaster's 
probability density. 
It will be assumed that the value of a payoff to a forecaster 
is in utility and not in money; because money usually has a 
diminishing marginal utility. If the payoff is positive and bounded 
by M, this can be achieved if one has a commodity whose utility 
is M and a device for randomizing with any size probability 
0 :5 p :5 1. In the sequential case, this solution does not apply 
because utility is not additive. This is solved not by paying 
increments in utility at each stage, but instead by paying one 
cumulated utility. For a philosophical study of utilities or 
- 5 -
"desirabilities" and subjective probabilities or "degrees of belief" 
see for example Ramsey (1965) or Jeffrey (1965). 
2. Summary. 
Chapters II and III apply the theory of convex analysis to 
studying the properties of a payoff function f and its corresponding 
expected payoff function H. Theorem 7 of Chapter II generalizes 
McCarthy's theorem and includes Buehler's (1970) class of payoffs 
defined on the domain of continuous distributions. This generali~ation 
is accomplished by generalizing Rockafellar's (1970) definition 
of subgradient from Euclidean space to Hilbert space. Theorems 
8, 9, and 10 give additional conditions on H to ensure that 
there exists f satisfying the requirements of Theorem 7. 
Chapters III and IV study payoff functions from the viewpoint 
of presenting a forecaster a choice of several random variables, 
whose value is to be given to the forecaster after the outcome 
of the experiment is observed. If the forecaster is to maximize 
his expected payoff, we can assume without loss of generality 
that the class C of choices is convex. The class C is also 
taken to be closed, because it is desired that a payoff with 
maximum expectation over C be a member of C. Chapter III 
studies the realtionship between payoff functions and closed convex 
classes of random variables. A one-to-one dual correspondence 
is given between closed convex sets C of choices and functions 
H whi~h are maximum expectations of honesty encouraging payoff 
functions f. 
- 6 -
I> l i 
~ 
~ 
: 
'-' 
-.mi• 
I . 
... 
i i..l. 
-... 
-
-
-
-
-
-
11111 
-
-
~ 
... 
_. 
-
... 
... 
-
.. 
.• i 
-... 
.. 
In Chapter IV, a method is described in which the forecaster 
is offered a sequence of choices,. where each offer may depend on 
the previous choices. A naive person at each stage might make the 
"honest choice" in which he maximizes his increment in expected 
payoff. However, a person who has knowledge of the procedure 
might make a "dishonest choice" at a given stage in order to 
increase his cumulated expected payoff. We consider, in Chapter IV, 
the properties of procedures in which the consistently honest choices 
at each stage lead to a maximum cumulated expected payoff at time 
n or in the limit as n ~ ro. The problem is simplified by con-
sidering a choice at each stage between only two random variables 
whose expectations depend only on one fixed unknown probability 
P(A). 
The sequential procedure is described in detail in Chapter IV. 
Necessary and sufficient properties are given for the classes of 
increments in payoffs which encourage honesty at either the nth 
stage, at every stage, or in the limit. 
Some problems are sketched in Chapter V which are not considered 
earlier in the paper. Comments are given on obtaining a consensus 
when a group of forecasters give several estimates of a density, on 
sequential procedures not considered in Chapter. IV, on other 
desirable properties of payoffs besides that of encouraging honesty, 
and on generalizing McCarthy's theorem to undominated classes of 
probability measures • 
- 7 -
CHAPTER II 
Honesty Encouraging Payoff Functions 
and a Theorem of McCarthy 
1. Introduction. 
Payoff functions are rewards to forecasters for their disclosure. 
of either their subjective probability measure or their assessment 
of a unique but unknown probability measure with a frequency inter-
pretation. A payoff function depends on both the disclosed 
probability measure and the future outcome of the corresponding 
random experiment. As we have mentioned in Chapter I, several 
authors have considered the use of payoff functions for either 
defining subjective probabilities or evaluating the performance 
of probability appraisers. 
McCarthy (1956) gave necessary and sufficient conditions on 
payoff functions to encourage honesty in the Euclidean case where 
the unknown probability vector is n-dimensional. McCarthy's 
theorem was stated somewhat ambiguously without proof. The theorem 
states that f is a payoff function which encourages honesty if£ 
f is the gradient of a convex function H which is homogeneous 
of degree one. The function H satisfies H(p) = E(f(p)lp) 
for all n-dimensional probability vectors p. 
There has been some confusion about McCarthy's Theorem, even 
though it needs only a slight modification to be precise. For 
example, Marschak (1960, page 97) argues in a footnote that although 
the honesty encouraging logarithmic payoff, fk(p) = log pk where 
p = (p1 , p2 , ••• , pn), is the partial derivative of a convex function 
- 8 -
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H, the function H can not be homogeneous. This is not true: 
every convex function H on a space P of probability vectors 
can be ·extended to a homogeneous function on D = (Ap:p€P, A> 0) 
H(Ap) = AH(p). The function defined from simply by defining 
the gradient of H * pk in the logarithmic case is fk (p) = log --I:p. 
J 
which encourages honesty not only on P but also on D. It 
seems natural to take all payoffs to be homogeneous of degree 
zero on D, and the corresponding expected payoff functions H 
to be homogeneous of degree one. 
2. Payoff functions. 
Let (X, G, ~) be a measure space and let P be a convex set of 
densities on (X, G) with respect to ~- Let ! be the set of 
real-valued random variables on (X, G). We will define a 
"payoff function" to mean any function f which maps P into 
!. Hence the value of f(p) will be dependent on p and the 
outcome of the experiment, we X. 
If a payoff is defined to be a real-valued random variable 
on (X, G), then the function f(p1) can be considered as the 
payoff given to an assessor for estimating p1 as the true probability 
density. The assessor's choice p1 e P may actually be presented 
as an infinite sequence of choices and f may be an infinite series 
- 9 -
of increments in payoffs depending only on previous choices, as 
in Chapter.IV. These increments in payoffs 
may arise from bets, they may be awards or penalties, and may 
have known distributions or unknown distributions depending on p. 
Let us assume that a person, when given the choice among the 
random payoffs in the range of f, will select a random payoff which 
he believes to have maximum expectation. Then a payoff function 
will keep that person honest if when offered f(p1 ) for telling 
us p1 , he nrust tell us the true density p in order that he 
maximizes his expectation, E(f(p1 )1p). Hence, we will say a 
payoff strictly encourages honesty if for ·P, p1 e P such that 
P1 + p a.e. µ, 
(1) 
We will say f encourages honesty if f satisfies the.less 
restrictive inequality 
(2) 
If (2) is satisfied, then in order to maximize his expectation with 
respect to p, an assessor must choose his assessment of p from 
the class 
(3) 
Thus, if an assessor chooses p1 for the questioned density and 
is allowed to be dishonest, then (2) implies the assessed value of 
p is a member of 
- 10 -
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If (2) holds, it will be shown in Section 6 that A(p1 ) is a 
convex set. 
Example 1. 
Let P(E) = p be unknown and let 
payoff function f by 
if 1 1 p > - then f(p) = -{ 0 
-2 
if E occurs 
if Ec occurs 
1 if p < 2 then f(p) 
= { 1 if E1 occurs 
0 if E1 occurs. 
Then f satisfies condition (2). If P = [O, 1] 
and See Chapter IV. 
Define the 
Example 2. 
2 
Let IIPII = J p2 (x )dµ(x) < oo for all p e r?. Define the 
random variable f(p) by 
f(p)(x) = fi(TI) for all x el, p e P. 
' p 
Then condition (1) is satisfied by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. 
3. P as a convex subset of a Hilbert space. 
The space ! of random variables is a vector space. Define 
the norm of p by 
2 
(5) IIPII = J p2 (x)dµ(x). 
Let t 2 (µ) be the space of all p where IIPII < oo. Define an 
inner product on ~(µ) by 
- 11 -
(6) < p, q > = J p(x}q(x}dµ(x}. 
The space t 2 (~) together with the inner product given by (6) is 
a Hilbert space (Halmos (1957), §9). The following relation is 
crucial in applying convex analysis to conditidns (1) and (2): 
(7) < p, q > = E(qlp) whenever p e P. 
To avoid difficulties in (1), (2), and (7) we will assume that the 
range of f is contained in the set 
(8) t 1 = t 1(P) = (q et: E(qJp) exists and is finite for 
all p e PJ. 
An important function related to the payoff function f(p) e t 1 
is the expected payoff function defined on P by 
(9) H(p) = < f(p), p >. 
In terms of H, conditions (1) and (2) become, respectively, 
( 10) H(p) >(< p, f(q) >) if p + q a.e. µ 
and 
(11) H(p) ~(< p, f(q) >) for all p, q e P. 
Conditions (9), (10), and (11) can be expressed in terms of useful 
concepts found in the theory of convex analysis. 
4. Review of some concepts of convex analysis. 
Rockafellar (1970) gave definitions and theorems about convex 
functions and subgradients for the special case that the Hilbert 
- 12 -
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space JI is Euclidean. These concepts are sufficient for the 
finite discrete case of McCarthy's theorem. We have utilized 
some of Rockafellar's definitions and theorems for more general 
spaces when they apply. Rather than prove that convex functions 
are continuous on the interior of their domains we must assume it. 
Theorem 5 implies that the graph of any continuous convex function H 
over a nonempty open domain corresponds to the boundary of a convex 
set whose supporting hyperplanes correspond to subgradients of H. 
When V is Euclidean, Theorem 5 is implied by Theorem 2j.4 of Rockafellar. 
Theorem 4 is given because, unlike Rockafellar, we have not 
assumed convexity as part of the definition of subgradient. The 
theory of convex sets in more general spaces is taken from 
Valentine (1964), Halmos (1957), and Kothe (1969). 
Let 'II denote any Hilbert space. Then the space 'ii x R 
is a Hilbert space with inner product given by 
(12) < (p, a), (q, a)>=< p, q > + ~-
The epigraph of a real-valued function H on a convex subset C 
of ';/ will be denoted by epi (H) and defined by 
epi (H) = ((p, a): p e C, a e R, a~ H(p)}. 
H is a convex function if£ epi (H) is a convex set. For this 
reason, the theory of convex sets, in Valentine (1964) for example, 
can be applied to convex functions. It is clear that the graph 
of H is contained in bdry(epi (H)) where the topology is 
given by the norm 
- 13 -
(13) ll(P, a)II 
2 
Generalized concepts of tangency are those of supporting 
hyperplanes to a set in a topological linear space t and 
subgradients of functions on a Hilbert space JI. A hyperplane is 
a set {pet: h(p) = a} where h is a linear functional on 
t, h ~ O. The hyperpiane (p e t:h{p) = a} supports a set C at 
x0e C if h(x)?: a for all x e C and h(x0 ) = a. Theorem 1 below 
is implied by Theorems 2.15 and 4.1 of Valentine (1964). Valentine's 
Theorems 2.8 and 2.15 are incorrect since he does not state the 
interior of the convex set must be nonempty. Valentine's proofs 
however are valid since they depend on the correctly stated Theorem 
2.7. An example of a convex set in which every point is a boundary 
point, yet no point except O has a hyperplane of support through 
it, is the space ~+(µ) of Example 7, Section 5. 
Theorem 1. 
If C is a convex subset of a topological linear space t and 
if the interior of C is nonempty, then through each of its boundary 
points there passes a closed hyperplane of support. Conversely, 
if C is closed, if the interior of C is nonempty, and if through 
each of its boundary points there passes a plane of support, then 
C is convex. 
If ! =U is a Hilbert space, then the hyperplanes of support 
of Theorem 1 can be characterized by using the Riesz representation 
theorem. We show this in Theorem 2. 
- 14 -
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Theorem 2. 
If (p e JI: h(p) = a} is a closed hyperplane contained in a 
* Hilbert space 'ii, then there exists q e 'JI such that 
* h(p) = < p, q > for all p e II. 
Proof: 
The set {p e U': h(p) = a} is closed iff the linear functional 
h is continuous on j/ with h ~ 0 (Theorem 2 .12, Valentine ( 1964)). 
Continuity of h on the compact set (p: IIPII ~ 1, p e H} implies 
there exists M > 0 such that h(b) < M. Hence by the Riesz 
11P11 -
representation theorem (page 31, Halmos (1957)), there exists 
* * q e ';/ such that h(p) = < p, q > for all p e 'ii. D 
The supporting hyperplanes in 'ii x R, with inner product given 
by (12), are of the form ((p, a): h1(p, 0) + h1(o, a)= a} where 
h1 is a linear functional on ti x R. These hyperplanes are of 
two forms: 
< i) c ( P, a): a = a - h( P) J 
{ii) {(p, a): h(p) = a, a e R}. 
The first set is a nonvertical hyperplane and the second is vertical. 
If H is convex on C then the supporting hyperplane at (q, H(q)) 
of epi (H) is seen to satisfy either 
(14) H(p) ~ h(p - q) + H(q) p e C 
or 
(15) h(p) ~ a p e C, h(q) = 13 
where h is a linear functional on W. (15) implies the only vertical 
supporting hyperplanes are on the boundary of C. The closed 
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supporting hyperplanes in {i) which are given by linear functionals 
* of the form h(p) = < p, q > are of interest in this paper. The 
point q* is a generalization of the gradient of H in Rn. We 
now generalize Rockafellar's definition of subgradient to the 
infinite-dimensional case. 
Definition 1 • 
If H is defined on a convex set C contained in a 
* vector space t and if there exists q e C and q et such 
* that the inner product < p, q > is defined for all p e C and 
(16) * H(p) >(< p - q, q >)+ H(q) for all p e C 
* then q is a subgradient of H at q. 
The following theorem shows that the subgradient is a general-
ization of the gradient when H is convex. 
Theorem 3.(Theorem 25.1, Rockafellar (1970)). 
Let H be a convex function on a convex set n CcR. If 
H is differentiable at q, then V H(q) is the unique subgradient 
of H at q, so in particular 
H(p) ~< p - q, vH(q) >)+ H(q) for all p e c. 
Conversely, if H has a unique subgradient at q, then H is 
differentiable at q. 
The following shows that the class of conyex functions 
contains the functions which are "subdifferentiable" at each point 
in their domain. 
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-Theorem 4. 
* If H has a subgradient q at each point q in a convex 
set C, then H is convex on C. 
Proof: 
Let p e c, q e c and define 
the subgradient of H at p1 • Then 
* H(p) ~(< p - pl, P1 >)+ H(pl) 
and 
Hence, 
Let be 
The converse of Theorem 4 is not true in general. However, th~ 
converse is true whenever epi(H) contains an open set in U x R. This is 
given in Theorem 5. Lemma l restates the condition on epi(H) in terms of 
continuity. The proof follows directly from the definition of continuity. 
Lemma 1. 
Let C be a convex set in 'JI whose interior is nonempty. 
Let H be a convex function on C which is continuous at a point 
p e int(C). Then epi (H) has a nonempty interior. 
Theorem 5 .· 
If C and H satisfy Lemma 1 then H has a subgradient 
* q e ';/ at each point q e int(C). 
Proof: 
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that at every point q e C there 
* exists a q e 'II such that either (14) or (15) hold, where 
- 17 • 
* h(p) = < p, q >. If q e int{C), then (15) cannot hold, so (14) 
* holds and q
1 
is a subgradient of C. D 
In Section 5 we give an example of a convex function H which 
has no subgradient at any point {Example 5), and an example of a 
continuous convex function whose subgradients are not members of 
W and int(C) = 0 (Example 7). We also give an example where 
H does have a subgradient in 'ii at each point in C, but H is 
not continuous (Example· 6). In all the examples given, H is 
homogeneous. 
If H is convex and homogeneous on a convex set C, then 
by putting H(Ap) = AH(p) - the domain of H can always be extended 
to the convex cone 
D = (Ap: p e C, A> O}. 
Thus without loss of generality we can assume H is defined on a 
convex cone. 
Lenuna 2. 
If H is homogeneous on a convex cone D and if for each 
q e D there exists a subgradient 
for all q e D. 
Proof: 
* * q e ti, the~ H(q) = < q, q > 
By letting p1 = AP, condition (16) and homogeneity imply 
(17) * H(p1) ~(< Pl - Aq, q >)+ ~H(q) for all q, pl e D. 
Also condition (16) implies 
(18) * H(Ap) ~(< AP - q, q >)+ H(q) for all p, q e D. 
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Taking the limit as A - 0 in (17) and (18) and letting p1 = q 
* we obtain H(q) = < q, q > for all q € V. D 
Definition 2. 
H is said to be strictly convex on a convex set C if 
(19) H((l-A)p + Aq) < (1-A)H(p) + AH(q) 
whenever p + q, p e C, q e C and O <A< 1. 
The following theorem is similar to page 94 of Valentine (1964). 
Theorem 6. 
The following statements are equivalent if H has a subgradient 
at each point in a convex set C: 
(i) H is strictly convex; 
(ii) H is nonlinear between any :two distinct points in C; 
(iii) Each nonvertical supporting hyperplane intersects epi (H) at 
exactly one point; 
(iv) If p e C and q e C and p + q then no subgradient of H 
at p is equal to a subgradient of H at q. 
Proof: 
(i) - (ii) - (iii)__. (iv) are obvious. (ii)~ (i) can 
be easily proved from the definition of convexity. D 
The theory of this section is enough to prove the more general 
version of McCarthy's theorem, which we present in the next 
section. Some other concepts in convex analysis which can be applied 
to payoff functions will be given in Chapter III. 
5. McCarthy's theorem. 
McCarthy stated his theorem for the special case that 'JI= Rn 
and P is the set of all n-dimensional probability vectors. The 
- 19 -
following is a restatement of McCarthy's theorem using our notation. 
Theorem. 
A payoff rule f satisfies (1) for all p, p1 e P iff there 
exists a homogeneous, convex function H such that f(p) is the 
gradient of H at p. The function H satisfies (9-). 
The theorem is incorrect in t~at either conditioo (1) should 
be replaced by (2) or the convexity of H should be replaced by 
strict convexity. Also, f need not be continuous and H 
does not necessarily have a gradient at each point p e P. However, 
McCarthy does state that "the derivative has to be taken in a 
suitably generalized sense." Examples 3 and 4 are given below 
to illustrate McCarthy's conditions. 
Example 3. 
n 
Let f(p) = {c1 , c2 , ••• , en). Then H(p) = ~ ckpk satisfies k=l 
McCarthy's theorem. Condition (2) holds but condition (1) doesn't 
because the payoff is independent of the forecaster's estimate. 
Example 4. 
Let 1 = {E, Ee} and p = (p1 , p2 ) where p2 = 1 - P1 • 
Define 
(1, 0) 
(o, 1) 
Then H(p) = < p, f(p) >=max {p1 , p2 } is convex and homogeneous. 
However, H is not differentiable at p1 = p2 • There is some 
1 leeway in defining ~(p) at p1 = p2 = 2 : fk(p) need only 
1 
satisfy O ~ f 1(p)::: 1, £1(p) + £2 (p) = 1 at p1 = 2 . 
- 20 -
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Examples of strictly convex f~nctions which are not differentiable 
everywhere can be found by considering functions of the form 
H(p) = max (H1(p), H2 (p)} where the Hic(p) are strictly convex 
on P. 
A corrected and generalized version of McCarthy's theorem is 
given below. Again, we assume t 1 and P are subsets of ! in 
* which the inner product {expectation)< p, q > is defined if 
* p e P and q e ! 1 • 
Theorem 7. 
A payoff rule f mapping P into ! 1 satisfies condition (2) 
[or condition (1)] iff there exists a homogeneous and convex 
[or strictly convex on P] function H defined on the convex 
cone D = (Ap: p e P, A> O} such that f{p) is the subgradient 
of H at p for all p e P. The function H satisfies condition 
(9). 
Proof: 
Assume f satisfies (2), and define H(Ap) = < ~p, f(p) > for 
p e P, A> O. Then f(q) is a subgradient of H at q (condition 
(11)). If f satisfies (1) then no subgradient of H at p is a 
subgradient of H at q {condition (10)). Apply Theorem 4 for 
the convexity of H and Theorem 6 for strict convexity. 
Conversely, if H has f(q) as a subgradient at q, for each 
q e P, and if H is homogeneous and convex, then applying Lemma 2 
and Definition 1, we obtain condition (2). Condition {iii) of 
Theorem 6 implies (1). 0 
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When condition (1) does hold, H is strictly convex not on 
D but on P. In general, the notions of strict convexity and 
homogeneity are contradictory. 
It might be asked what class of functions H satisfy the 
conditions of Theorem 7. Although every function which is convex 
on P can be extended to a homogeneous and convex function on 
the cone D of Theorem 7, every such function does not satisfy the 
additional requirement of having subgradients at each point q e P. 
When t = Rn, this additional requirement is met on the interior 
of P. We will prove a more general result for Pc~{µ) 
(Theorem 8). The following example shows that H must be restricted. 
Example 5. 
Let P be the class of continuous, bounded densities 
{sup p(x) < 00) on {R, 8, µ,) where I-Ji is Lebesgue measure X 
and ~ consists of the Borel sets. Define H(p) = sup p{x). 
X 
Then H is clearly convex on P. However, H is neither continuous 
at any P e r (with respect to IIPII) nor does H have a subgradient 
for any P e P. 
For the remainder of this section, the Hilbert space ti can 
be taken to be either ~{µ) or the smallest closed subspace of 
t 2 (µ) containing P, where Pc~(µ). According to Theorem 8 below, 
the functions satisfying Theorem 8 are contained in the class of 
functions which are maxitmlm expectations of payoff functions 
which encourage honesty. 
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Theorem 8. 
If the set of densities D c·';/ is a convex set and if H is 
convex and homogeneous on D and continuous at a point p in the 
interior of D, then there exists f such that conditions (9) 
and (11) hold on the interior of ·D. The range of f may be 
taken in ';/. 
Proof: 
Whenever p e int(D), apply Theorem 5 and let f(p) be a 
subgradient of H at p. The proof follows from Lemma 2. D 
The following theorem gives equivalent conditions on f for 
the conditions on H in Theorem 8. 
Theorem 9. 
If D is a convex cone in 'M whose interior is nonempty 
and if H and f satisfy (9) and (11) on D, then H is continuous 
at p e int{D) iff there exists a neighborhood of p on which 
II f (•)II is bounded. 
Proof: 
Let pn e D, llPn - PII - 0 as n - oo. Let 
Then 
H(pn + q) >(< p + q, f(p) >) 
n - n n n 
= H(p) + < q f(p) > 
n n' n 
= H(p ) + 1. 
n 
Thus, if H is continuous at p, we cannot have llq 11 - o. n Thus 
we can not have II f ( p n) 11 .... co. Henoe II f (•)II is bounded on a neighborhood of p. 
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Conversely, if llf(•)II is bounded on a neighborhood of p, then 
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality 
(20) 
(9) and (11) imply 
(21) H(p) >(< p, f(p) >) 
n - n 
and 
(22) H(p) >(< p, f(p) >). 
- n 
(9) and (21) imply lim H(p) > lim < p, f(p) > = H(p). · The latter 
- n - n 
equality· follows from continuity of < •, f(p) > (Halmos,1957 §17)~ 
(9), (20), and (22) imply 
H(p) > lim H(p }. 
- n 
Hence H(p) = lim H(pn) if IIPn- PII - 0. 0 
n-+ 00 
The results of Theorem 9 on local conditions on H and f 
easily give the foll~ing results on global conditions on H and f. 
Corollary • 
If f and H satisfy (9) and (11) on an open convex cone 
D c ';/ then H is continuous on D iff 11£(•)11 is bounded on 
every closed set contained in D. 
Proof: 
Since f(A.p) = f{p) if A. > 0, llf( • )II is bounded on every 
closed set contained in D is equivalent to llf(•)II bounded on 
every compact set in D which in turn is equivalent to the require_-
ment of Theorem 9 that II f( • )II be "locally bounded" at each point 
.. 
r 
w 
i 
I.I 
' I .. 
I 
... 
i I 
~ 
I 
p e int ( D) • D ...i 
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Theorem 10 shows that the restriction of the maximum expected 
payoff functions to be continuous .with respect to IIPII on all 
of ~(µ) is merely the restriction of payoff functions to be 
bounded when the condition of encouraging honesty is met. 
Theorem 10. 
If H and f satisfy conditions { 9 ) and ( 11) for all points 
in a Hilbert space 'JI, then the following are equivalent: 
{i) H is continuous; 
(ii) H is bounded on the sphere {p e N': IIPII = l}; 
( iii) f is bounded. 
Proof: 
{ii) follows from (i) since the sphere is compact. Suppose 
condition (ii) holds. As a consequence of conditions { 9) and (11) 
and the fact that f(q) e ,t if q e 'ii we have 
H( 11:f :h ) ~(< 11:f :~11 • f(q) >)= ilf(q)II 
and hence (iii) follows. Condition (iii) implies (i) by the previous 
corollary. D 
The following example shows that the class of maximum expected 
payoffs H satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6 contains 
discontinuous convex functions. 
Example 6. 
Let X = (0, 1), µ be Lebesgue measure, and ij be the Borel 
subsets of X. Let H(p) be the norm 
- 25 -
and define the payoff f to be 
f(p) = [ :f:~ Ja-1 
where a> 2. Then H satisfies (9), and Holder's ·inequality is 
equivalent to (10), where P is taken to be the set of densities 
where H is finite. The domain of H is the familiar vector 
space ! (µ) = (p: H(p) < ooJ, and H 
a 
is the usual norm. The 
space !a{µ) c ! 2 (µ) is not closed with respect to the norm IIPII, 
nor is the norm H(p) continuous with respect to IIPII• 
Example 7, below, illustrates that Theorem 8. possibly can be 
generalized. The function H below cannot be extended to a convex 
domain whose interior ·is nonempty without losing its property of 
convexity; yet H satisfies (9) and (11) and is continuous. 
•. 
! I 
' ' ~ 
I i i I 
la.I 
! I 
-..i 
Example 7. I.I 
Let (X, B, µ) be the space given in Example 6. Let 
~+ = ! 2+(µ) = {p: p(x) > 0 for all x ¢ X, J p2 dµ < ooJ. Define f 
by 
f(p)(x) = 
ln{ p{x) ) if p(x) +.o, p + 0 a.e. µ 
Jpdµ 
0 if p(x) = 0 or p = 0 a.e. µ . 
Define the function H by (9). Since 
-1 2 
-e < X ln X < X 
we have pf(p) dominated above by p2 {x) and below by -e-l if J pdµ,= 1. 
Therefore, since µ is finite on X = [O, 1), H(p) is finite for 
all + P e ~ • H and f do satisfy (9) and (11) 
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The function H is continuous on ~+ with respect to 11·11· 
To prove this, let + + Pn e £2 , p e ~ and IIP - PII - 0 as n n - co. 
Give e > 0 and let. 6 > 0 be such that jx_ln xi< e if 
O<x<o and such that M > 1 where 1 1 M - - ln - • 
- & 6 Then it can 
easily be shown that 
Ix ln x - y ln yJ ~ Mlx2 - y21 
if either x > 6 or y 2: 6. Thus, by integrating IP ln p - p ln p I 
n n 
over the set {x: 0 < x < 1, p{x) < 6, p {x) < &} and the set 
- - n 
(x: 0 ~ x ~ 1, p{x) ~ 6 or p {x) > 6) we obtain 
n -
1 
IH(p) - H{p ) I ~ 2e + M j )p2 (x) - p 2 (x) ldx. 
n O n 
1 
Since lim J jp2 {x) - pn2 (x)fdx = 0 and since e > 0 is arbitrary, 
n- 00 0 
lim H(p) = H{p). 
n 
n--t 00 
+ If p e ~, then every neighborhood of p contains functions 
which are negative over sets of positive measure. Hence + 12 has 
no interior points and Theorem 7 does not apply. 
Although every member of ~+ is a boundary point, the space 
~+ has no closed hyperplanes of :support through any of its nonzero 
* * members. For, if (< >,,.q, q >}2:(< q, q >) for all >... > O then 
* * + < q, q > = 0, and if ( < p, q >)2: 0 for all p e 12 then 
* + q = 0 a.e. µ. Thus the convex set ~ is a counterexample to 
the set C in Theorem 2.15 of Valentine (1964), unless we add the 
requirement that the interior of C be nonempty. 
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CHAPTER III 
Support Functions 
1. Introduction. 
The viewpoint of a payoff function f to a forecaster, as 
in Chapter I, can be studied from the viewpoint of a class C 
of choices of payoffs to a forecaster·, as in Chapter IV. The 
present chapter studies the one-to-one relationship between closed 
convex classes C and the corresponding expectation function H. 
Let f and H satisfy conditions (9) and (11) on a subset 
Pc~ of a Hilbert space. Let c1 be the range of f. If 
when offered the payoff f(p) for his appraisal p, a forecaster 
is allowed to be dishonest, then the forecast~r is actually offered 
a choice between the random variables in c1• Define the closed 
and convex set C by 
* (23) C = {q e ~:{< q, p >) < sup 
* 
< q, p > for all p e P}. 
q ec1 
C is closed because it is the intersection of the closed half-
spaces (q e ~: (< q, P >) < 
contained in C. In a sense, 
sup 
* q eC1 
* < q , p > }. Obviously 
C and c1 are equivalent 
is 
because we could offer a forecaster his choice of the random 
variables in C and his maximum expectation would remain unchanged. 
For this reason, in this chapter we will take any class of choices 
of payoffs to be closed and convex. 
Conversely, it will be shown in Section 2 that for any given 
closed convex C there corresponds an f and an H satisfying 
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(9) and (11), provided sup< p, q > is attained in C for 
qeC 
each p e P. 
* After the forecaster has made his choice p1 e C, the class 
of possible values of the forecaster's undisclosed p is the set 
(24) * * A ( pl ) = ( p e P: < pl*, p > = sup < q, p > J • 
qeC 
If is the honesty encouraging payoff 
is the class A(p1 ) given by (4). The sets 
f(p1 ) then A*(p/) 
* * A (p1 ) will be shown 
to be convex (the intersection of P with the normal cone of C 
* at p1 ) if C is convex and closed. 
Dual relationships between H and C are given in this 
chapter. It is shown that p nust be normal to C at f(p) 
if f(p) c C is to encourage honesty. The theorems and definitions 
are found in Valentine (1964) or Rockafellar (1970), at least when 
M is Euclidean. Theorem 12 is given in Kothe (1969). 
2. Support functions. 
The maximum expectation function H of a payoff function f 
which encourages honesty, which was shown in section 5 to be convex 
and homog_eneous, can be interpreted as a support function of a 
certain convex set. The theory of support functions given in this 
section is found in Part V of Valentine (1964). we again assume 
M is a Hilbert space, usually t 2(µ). 
Definition 3. 
If C is a convex set then the function H defined on the 
set 
- 29 -
(25) D = {p e ~:sup(< p, q >) < ~J 
qeC 
by the equation 
(26) H(p) =sup< p, q > 
qeC 
is the support function of C. 
The following theorem is a direct result of (25) and is 
Theorem 5.1 of Valentine (1964). 
Theorem 11. 
The domain D of definition of a support function H is a 
convex cone. 
Note that (26) implies H is homogeneous and convex on D. 
We defined H in terms of C in (26). There is a one-to-one 
correspondence between homogeneous and convex functions H and 
closed convex sets C, where the domain of H is given by (25). 
We will prove this in Theorem 13. 
For a given homogeneous and convex function H 
a set D c ~, define C by the equation 
defined on 
(27) * * C = {p: (< p, p >) :S, H(p) for all p e D}. 
* * Then C is closed because the half-space {p: (< p, p >) :S, H(p)J 
is closed for each p e D. We will prove Theorem 13 from the 
following theorem given in Kothe (1969), §20.7, Theorem 1. 
Theorem 12. 
Let C be a closed convex subset of a locally convex space 
L and let K be a compact convex set which is disjoint from A. 
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Then there exists a closed hyperplane which separates A and K 
strictly • 
Theorem 13 specializes to Theorem 5.3 of Valentine (1964) 
whenever ~ is Euclidean. 
Theorem 13. 
Let C be a nonempty closed convex set contained in a Hilbert 
space ~ and let H be its support function with nonempty domain 
of definition D. Then C satisfies (27). 
Proof: 
Let c1 be given by (27) where H is the support function 
of C. Then Cc c1• Suppose there exists q e c1- C. Since 
{q} is ~ompact, Theorem 12 and Theorem 2 imply there exists p e ~ 
and a e R such that (< p, q >)>a and * (< P, P >)<a for 
* all p e C. Equation (25) implies p e D and (26) implies 
H(p) ~a<(< p, q >). This contradicts q e c1 • Thus c1 = C. D 
A theorem similar to that given by Theorem 7 can be given in 
terms of the closed convex set C in (27). To state the theorem 
we need the following two definitions. 
Definition 4 (pages 15 and 100, Rockafellar (1970)). 
Let C be a closed convex set. Then p is normal to C at 
* p if 
* • < p, p > = sup < p, q >. 
... 
-
.... 
.... 
qeC 
Definition 5 (Definition 7.5, Valentine (1964)). 
A convex set Cc M is smooth if at each of its boundary 
points there is a unique hyperplane of support to c. A convex 
- 31 -
function H is smooth (differentiable if H = Rn) if H has 
a unique subgradient at every point of its domain. 
Theorem 14. 
A payoff function f on a space Pc H encourages honesty 
[strictly) if and only if there exists a closed convex [smooth) 
set Cc H such that for each p e P, p is normal to C at 
f(p). The set C may be taken to be 
(28) C = {q: (< p, q >) ~ (< p, f(p) >) for all p e P). 
Proof: 
If f encourages honesty, define· C by (28). By definition, 
p is normal to C at f(p). Conversely, if C is closed and 
convex and p is normal to C at f(p), then f(p) e C (else 
C is not closed) so 
(29) (< p, f(p) >) 2: (< p, f(q) >) for all p, q e P. 
Equality holds in (29) for some p and q e P, where p + q, iff 
both p and q are normal to C at f(q). In other words, C 
has two hyperplanes of support through f(q). Thus if (28) and 
(29) hold then C is smooth iff strict inequality holds in (29) 
for all p, q e P, p + q. D 
As in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Theorem 14, a closed convex 
set C is smooth iff its support function H is strictly convex. 
This relationship is dual: C contains a line segment on its 
boundary (is not strictly convex) iff there exists p which is 
normal to C at two distinct points f(p) * and p, and this is 
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true iff H is not smooth (there exists p such that H has 
two subgradients f(p) * and p at p). 
The question, about which Theorem 8 is concerned, of when a 
convex homogeneous function H has a subgradient at each point 
p e P, can be restated as the question of when a closed convex set 
* * C has a closed hyperplane of support of the form {p: < p, p >=a} 
for each p e P. The following theorem, which is similar to 
Theorems 7 and 8, is given in Valentine (1964), Theorem 5.2. 
Theorem. 
If C is a bounded closed nonempty convex set in ~, then for 
* * each p e ~ there exists a point p e C such that H(p) = < p, p > 
where H is the support function of C. 
The following example shows that the boundedness of C in the above 
Theorem is necessary, even whe~ its support function is bounded. 
Example 8. 
Let H = R2 • Let C = ((p1 ,' p2 ): pl< 0, p2 :: ! ). Then the 
11 
boundary of C is the graph of the function h(x) = - for x < O. 
X 
C is closed and convex. The set D given by (25) is the set 
{p: pl~ 0, p2 ::: 0}. If p e D ~nd pl f 0, p2 f 0 then p ~~ is normal to C at the point f(p) = (-,/-;:.=-, -J-f:-- ). The 
pl P2 
support function H is defined for all p e D by H(p) = -2J p1p; 
H is bounded, continuous and convex on the set P = {peD: p1+ p2= 1), 
yet H has no subgradients at the points (0, 1) or (1, o). 
The set A(p1 ) given in equation (4) of Chapter 2 is the 
intersection of P with a normal cone, defined below • 
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Definition 6 (page 135, Valentine (1964)). 
* Let C be a closed, convex set. Let Q(p) be the 'set of 
* * all points which are normal to C at p. Then Q(p) is the 
* normal cone of C at p. 
If f satisfies (2) and C satisfies (27), then 
A(p1) = Q(f(p1)) n P for each p e P. According to Theorem 11.1 of 
* * Valentine (1964), the normal cone Q(p) is convex.for each p 
on the boundary of C. Thus A(p1 ) is convex for each p1 e P. 
Alternatively, if (9) and (11) hold, then A(p1) is the projection 
on l:! of the intersection of the convex set epi (H) c ~ x R with 
its supporting hyperplane {{p, a): a=< p, f(p1 ) > ). Thus 
A(p1) is convex. 
In the following example, f, H, and C satisfy conditions 
(9), (11), and (27). The convex cones * Q(p) are illustrated 
in Figure 1 when they consist of more than one point-when the 
* boundary of C is not smooth at p. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
the relationships between C and f and between H and f. 
Example 9. 
Let l:! = R2 • Let 
C = { P: 0 S Pl ~ P2 , 11 PII < 1} U ( P: 0 S P 2 ~ P 1, P 1 + P2 ~ ,/2.) • 
Then C is a closed convex set. If p is normal to C at f(p), 
and if p is not of the form (0, -a), (-a, 0), or {a, a) 
where a_::: 0, then f(p) is uniquely determined: 
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plf if 0 ~ P1 < P2 
(J2, 0) if 0 < P1, P2 < P1 
f(p) = 
I (o, o) if · pl < 0, p2 < 0 
{o, 1) if Pl~ 0, p2 > O. 
The support function H of C ts defined by f in equation (9): 
I 
IIPII if 0 ~pl~ P2 
J2 pl if 0 ~ pl' P2 ~ pl 
H(p) = 
I 
P2 if Pl :5 0, p2 2: 0 
0 if Pl :S 0, p2 :SO. 
Note the dual relationship between smoothness and strict 
convexity of H and C. Also note that f(p) lies on the boundary 
and is continuous where the boundary of C is strictly convex, and 
constant on the cone where the boundary is not smooth {rough). The 
boundary of C differs from the·range of f only at the points where 
C is not strictly convex. See Figures 1 and 2 • 
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Q(0,1)+(0,1) 
P2 
P1 
Q{l,0)+(1,0) 
Figure 1. The convex set C of Example 9 and its cones of support. 
H(pl,1-pl) 
epi{H) 
* {(p1,a): < p, f(p) >=a} 
----~-------------+--------· pl (o,o) * P1 1 
Figure 2. The support function H as a function of p1 , on the set 
{p: ~1 + P2 = l}. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Some Sequential Procedures Which Encourage Honesty 
1. Introduction. 
Definitions of "subjective" or· "personal" probability, such 
as that of Savage, involve hypothetical preferences or choices 
of a subject which carry information about subjective probability 
values. For example, Savage {1954, p. 28) says: 
We therefore address him thus: "We see you are about to 
open those eggs. If you will be so cooperative as to 
guess that one or the other egg is good, we will pay 
you a dollar, should your guess prove correct. If in-
correct you and we are quits, except that we will in 
any event exchange your two eggs for two of guaranteed 
goodness." If under these circumstances the person 
stakes his chances on the brown egg, it seems to me to 
correspond well with ordinary usage to say that it is 
more probable to him that the brown one is good than 
the white one is. 
By replacing the breaking of one egg {outcomes "good" or 
"bad") with the toss of a fair coin (outcomes "heads" or "tails") 
we may determine whether the subjective probability of the 
remaining egg being good is > 1/2 or < 1/2. If further choices 
are then offered, the subjective probability presumably can be 
restricted to narrower limits. We find however that certain 
difficulties arise in the choice of stake at each stage of the 
procedure. In short, an apparently "dishonest choice" may in 
some cases be advantageous to the subject. The present chapter is 
concerned with the characterization of procedures which "encourage 
honesty." 
Sequential proc~dures are studied in which, for simplicity, 
each choice divides in half the range of possible values of 
- 37 -
the probability. These procedures are described in Section 2. 
Section 3 gives expressions for the cuaulate~ expected payoff. 
In Seetion 4 we _define payoffs which "encourage honesty" to be 
those having the.property that the "honest c~ice"· by the subject 
at each stage gives the largest cumlated expected-payoff when 
the true pro~ability is known. Sections 5 and 6 ·establish some 
properties of expected payoffs, including characteristic~ of 
payoffs which encourage honesty for finite sequential procedures. 
The infinite case is discussed in Section 7. 
-· 2. Description of the procedure. 
Let A denote an event having unknown probability· p and 
let Br denote an event with known probability r. (we assume 
such exist for r = 1/2, 1/4, 3/4, 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, etc. Of course 
the existence of a single fair coin whic~ can be tos~ed repeatedly 
implies this.) The appraiser is offered a ·sequence of choices of 
prospects. At any step Prospect A is a payoff of g(r) if A 
occurs and Prospect B is a payoff of g(r) if B occurs~ 
~ r . 
It 
remains to describe the sequence {r) of r-values and to choose 
n 
g(r). This is to be done in such a way t~t ~he best choices for 
the appraiser when p is actually known will allow us to deduce 
the value of p from his choices. 
Consider the following particular choice. At Step 1, r = r1 = 1/2. 
At Step 2, r = r 2 = 1/4 or 3/4 according as Prospect B or A 
was chosen at Step 1. 
either -n r 1- 2 or n-
Similarly at Step n, r = r will be 
n 
-n r 1+ 2 according as the preceding choice n-
was B or A. Clearly the idea here is to obtain a sequence of 
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r values converging to the true p when it is known, or to 
the appraised value p in any case. The appraiser will presumably 
attempt to maximize his expected payoff which he will calculate 
using p rather than p when the latter is unknown. Of course 
at Step 1 he then chooses A if p > 1/2 provided he only considers 
the payoff determined by this first choice. If however the 
rules for the subsequent steps are known to him,the "dishonest" 
choice of B when p > 1/2 could actually increase his 
expectation at later stages. For this reason the choice of 
values g(r) is relevant to an honest appraisal. 
3. Expressions for expected payoff functions. 
Let a = -1 j if Prospect B is chosen at the jth step and 
a.= +l if A is chosen. Then r can be expressed by 
J n 
(30) 
n-1 1 ~ -j-1 
r = 2 + LJ 2 aj, n j=l 
n=2, 3, ... , 
and r 1 = 1/2. 
There are slightly troublesome difficulties which arise 
when the appraiser is indifferent between the two prospects. For 
example, if p = 1/2 he is indifferent between A and B. 
However in the case when n - ~ we can still obtain r - 1/2 
n 
whether r 2 = 1/4 or 3/4. It would be desirable here to choose 
the values g(r) so that the expected payoff does not depend 
on which choice ·is made in any case where the appraiser is 
indifferent. The extent to which this can be accomplished will 
be considered below. 
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(31) 
(32) 
( 33) 
It is convenient to define 
C ={xix= 2-~, k = 1, 3, •.. , 2n-1) 
n 
D = 
n 
n 
U C. 
j=l J 
D = D • 
00 
Then our payoff function g(r) is to be defined for all re D 
(although we will also consider finite procedures requiring only 
r e D ) • 
n 
At Step n the payoff is either g(r) with proqability 
n 
r if B is chosen (a = -1) or g(r) with probability p 
n n n 
if A is chosen (a = +l). Thus the increment in the expected 
n 
payoff is r g(r) 
n n 
if a = -1 or pg(r) if a = +1. The 
n n n 
cumulated expected payoff at the nth step depends on p and on 
the partial sequence of choices 
( 34) 
and can be expressed as 
(35) H (a' p) = F (a)+ pG (G) n n n n n n 
where 
(36) Fn(Gn) = ~ rkg(rk) 
l~~n 
ak=-t 
(37) G (G )= ~ g{rk). n n ls:ks:n 
ak=+l 
- 40 -
• 
I 
I I 
~ 
I I 
~ 
I 
~ 
.. 
; 
; 
-
... 
-' 
-' 
.. 
ml 
-
-
-
Im 
... 
.. 
-
... 
.... 
-
... 
._ 
Now let r be any value O < r < 1 and rt 0n· Then r 
determines a unique binary expansion up to the nth term, and so 
we may replace (34) by 
(38) H (r, p) = F (r} + pG (r) 
n n n 
understanding that r determines a unique a. 
n 
From (38) we 
see that the cumulated expected payoff H {r, p) is linear in p 
n 
and a step function in r whose discontinuities occur at the 
points of D, that is at multiples of 
n 
-n 2 , or we may say at 
exactly those points of {o, 1) where H (•, p) 
n 
is not defined. 
It is straightforward to calculate the jump in H ( •, p) 
n 
each discontinuity. Consider first Case 1: r = k/2n where k 
is odd (that is r e C ) • We find 
n 
(39) F (r-) - F (r+) = rg(r} 
n n 
(40) G (r+) - G (r-} = g(r). 
n n 
For Case 2, we express any other point r of discontinuity 
at 
(r c D 1 = D - C ) uniquely in the form r = 2-sk where k is n- n n 
odd and s < n. For these we find 
(41) F (r-) - F (r+) 
n n 
n-s . . 
= rg(r) - ~ (r + 2-s-J}g(r + 2-s-J) 
j=l 
(42) G (r+} - G (r-) 
n n 
n-s 
= g(r) - ~ g(r - 2-s-j). 
j=l 
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4. Payoffs which encourage honesty. 
The ~rocedure described thus far can be related to Chapters I 
and II. Define h(n) = (hin), hin)) by 
h(n)(r) tr ) if a = +l (43) 
g(rn)r 
n 
= 1 if -1 a = n n n 
h~n)(r) = {° if a = +l (44) n 
g(r )r if a = -1 n n n 
and define f(n) = (fin), f~n)) by 
(45) /n)(r) = ~ h(k)(r). 
k=l 
Then at each n h(n) 
' 
is a payoff function- which encourage_s 
honesty (satisfies condition (2)) because r > r implies 
n 
a = +1 and r < r implies a = -1. We wish to consider 
n n n 
procedures in which for any fixed n the cumulated payoff function 
(46) 
encourages honesty. 
The function H (r, p) satisfies for each n, 
n 
H {r, p) = < f(n)(r), p >. 
n 
Thus for given n, Hn(p, p) is the function H (p) defined by (9 ). 
n 
Hence if is to encourage honesty, it is necessary and 
sufficient that Hn(p, p) be convex on (0, 1) [or P s= [O, 1]]. 
We assume that the appraiser knows the rules by which the 
payoffs are to be made, including the payoff values g(r). The 
range of values of H {r, p) (where O < p < 1 is fixed and 
n 
- 42 -
• u 
w 
i I i.J 
. I 
w 
I 
w 
! 
w 
... 
.-
..... 
-
.... 
... 
-
.... 
.... 
.. 
-
...i 
-
-
-
-
-
.... 
-
... 
-
r e (0, 1) - D ) 
n 
is the set of all possible expected payoffs 
for the appraiser at time n. From (35) through (38) the appraiser 
can calculate his expected payoff from the value of r which 
determines the sequence a and from a presumed value of p. 
n 
A payoff function would strictly encourage honesty if 
(47) H (p, p) > H {r, p) for all r + p. 
n n 
But since H (r, p) is a step function in r we cannot actually 
n 
achieve inequality for all r + p. If p + 2-I\c (k odd), let 
Ikn be the interval (2-~, 2-n(k+l)) (k odd) which contains p. 
We require ·e, 
(48) Hn(p, p) > Hn{r, p) all rt Ikn' 
for all p + 2-11t. Any payoff g(r) such that (48) is satisfied 
will be said to "encourage honesty" at the nth stage. For p 
values on the boundary points 2-1,c no additional requirement is 
needed since (48) is strong enough to imply appropriate behavior. 
More specifically, it can be shown that when p = 2-1,c 
(49) H (p+, p) = H (p-, p) > H {r, p) all re [O, l] - D. 
n n - n n 
The proof uses (48) and continuity of H (r, p) as a function 
n 
of p. Hence if (48) holds and p e D then the appraiser's 
n 
maximum expected payoff is H (p+, p) = H (p-, p). 
n n 
For simplicity, 
extend the domain of definition of H {r, p), F (r), and G {r) 
n n n 
to re (0, 1) by right-continuity. Then (48) is equivalent to 
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(50) H (p, p) > H {r, p) 
n - n 
with equality only when both p and r belong to the same 
interval (2-~, 2-n(k+l).) or when p = 2-~ and re: (2-n(k-1), 
2-n(k+l)). 
5. Properties of cuurulated honesty encouraging payoffs. 
We first consider properties of H defined by (38) which 
n 
hold for r~ther arbitrary Fn 
defined on (0, 1) and define 
and G. 
n 
Let F and G 
(51) H(r, p) = F{r) +·pG{r) for r, p e:.{O, 1) 
and let 
(52) H(p, p) ~ H(r, p) for r, p e (o, 1). 
be 
Except that the payoff function (G(p) - F(p), F(p)) has its 
. R2 range 1.n and its domain in R1 , the discussion of this section 
is a special case of Chapter I, in particular Theorem 7. 
Theorem 15 below is proved directly from (51) and (52). 
Condition (ii) points out why "encouraging honesty" provides an 
"incentive for accuracy." 
Theorem 15. 
Let F, G, and H be defined on (o, 1) and satisfy (51) 
and (52). Then (i) F is nonincreasing and G is nondecreasing. 
(ii) for fixed p, H(r, p) is nonincreasing for r > p and 
nondecreasing for r < p. (iii) H(p, p) is continuous. 
I 1 
u 
I 
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Im 
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Proof: W 
(i) Using (52) twice we have 
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F(p) + G(p)p ~ F(r) + G(r)p 
= F(r) + G(r)r - G{r)(r-p) 
~ F(p) + G(p)r - G{r){r-p) 
= F(p) + G(p)p + G(p)(r-p) - G{r){r-p). 
Thus {G(p) - G{r))(r-p) ~ 0, which implies G is nondecreasing. 
Assuming· p < r, using (52) again, and G(p) S G(r) 
F(p) + pG(p) ~ F{r) + pG{r) 
~ F{r) + pG(p) 
completing the proof of (i). {ii) If p ~ r ~ s, by (52) and 
(i), 
F{r) + pG(r) = F(r) + rG{r) + (p-r)G(r) 
~ F(s) + rG{s) + (p-r)G{s) 
= F{s) + pG{s) • 
If p S s S r 
F(r) + pG(r) = F(r) + sG(r) + (p-s)G(r) 
~ F{s) + sG(s) + (p-s)G(s) 
= F{s) + pG(s) 
which proves (ii). {iii) Let {y) be either an increasing or 
n 
a decreasing sequence with limy = p. Then both lim F(y) 
n n 
and lim G(y) exist, and using (52) twice 
n 
F(p) + pH(p) > lim {F(y) + pG{y )) = lim {F(y) + y G(y )) 
- n n n n n 
~ lim {F(p) + y
0
G(p)) 
= F(p) + pG(p). 0 
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Theorem 16. 
Let F(•) and G(•) be_ defined on (0, 1) and let H 
be defined by (51). Then (52) holds if and only if G is 
nondecreasing and 
1 
(53) F(r) = J z dG(z) + C 
r 
for some constant c. 
Proof: 
Assume (53) and G nondecreasing. Then 
s J {z-r)dG{z) >O if s > r 
H{r, r) - H(s, r} r = r J (r-z)dG{z} > 0 if s < r 
s 
so that (52) holds. Now assume (52). Then by Definition 1, 
G(r) is a subgradient of H(p, p) at p = r for every re (0, 1). 
Hence H is convex by Theorem 1. Since convexity implies absolute 
continuity on (0, 1), Theorem 3 implies 
(54) 
r 
H(p, p) = f G(z)dz + c. 
0 
By integration by parts, (51) implies (53) and (54) are equivalent 
express ions • D 
Corollary 1. 
If F and G are right-continuous step functions, then 
necessary and sufficient conditions for (52) are: (i) G is 
nondecreasing; (ii) H(p, p) is continuous for all p. 
Proof: 
Let {rk)~1 be the points where either F or G is 
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discontinuous. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for 
(53) is 
F(rk-) - F{rk+) = rk[G{rk+) - G{rk-)] all k, 
and this is equivalent to (ii). D 
The convex sets A(p1 ) defined by equations (4) and (24) are 
defined in the present context by 
A{r) = {p: H{p, p) = H(r, p)). 
Corollary 2 below states that these sets are the closures of 
the intervals where F or G are constant. Define the interval 
IG{r) by 
IG{r) = (p: G{r) = G(p-) or G{r) = G(p+)} . 
Corollary 2 • 
If (51) and (52) hold then 
A(r) = IF(r) = IG(r). 
Proof: 
If (51) and (52) hold then p e A{r) if£ 
(55) F(p) - F(r) = p[G(r) - G(p)] • 
Theorems 15 and 16 imply G is nondecreasing and (55) holds if£ 
r r J zdG(z) = J pdG(z), or 
p p 
r J (z-p)dG{z) = 0. 
p 
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But the above integral is zero iff G(z) = G(r) for all z 
betw~en r and p. Hence A(r) = IG(r). Theorem 16 implies 
IF(r) = IG{r). 0 
6. Properties of payoffs which encourage honesty. 
We now apply the preceding results to determine properties of 
the payoffs g(r) which will encourage honesty. 
Lenuna 3. 
Let F , G, H be defined by (38) through (42). 
n n n 
Then 
Hn(p, p) is continuous if and only if 
(56) n-s n-s ~ (r+2-s-j)g(r+2-s-j) = r ~ g(r-2-s-j) 
j=l j=l 
and for all s = 1, 2, ••• , n-1. 
Proof: 
for all re C 
s 
Hn(p, p) is continuous at rt en by (39) and (40). At 
re D 1 = D - C , continuity of Hn(p, p) is equivalent to n- n n 
F (t-)-F (r+) ~ r(G(r+)- G{r-)). 
n n 
(41) and (42) give (56). D 
Theorem 17. 
Let F, G, H be defined by (38) through (42) and the 
n n n 
assumption of right-continuity. 
conditions for (48) are (56) and 
n-s . 
(57) g(r) > ~ g{r-2-s-J) 
j=l 
for s = 1, 2, ••• , n-1. 
Proof: 
Then necessary and sufficient 
all r e: C , 
s 
We can use the theorem of Section 5 with subscript n added 
to F, G, and H. Using Corollary 3 it is easy to see that (48) is 
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equivalent to (52) with the additional condition that 
G (p+) t G (p-) for p e D. Hence by Corollaries 2 and 3 
n n n 
we have (48) holds if and only if the following three conditions 
hold: 
(i) Gn is nondecreasing 
{ii) Hn(p, p) is continuous 
(iii) Gn(p+) f Gn(p-) for p e Dn. 
By Lemma 3, cond_ition (ii) is equivalent to { 56). Since G is 
n 
a step function with jumps given by (42), we have conditions (i) 
and {iii) equivalent to (57). 0 
Theorem 18. 
Let F , G, H be defined by (38) through (42) for 
n n n 
n = 1, 2, •••• Then necessary and sufficient conditions for (48) 
to hold for all positive integers n are that for every 
m k = 3, 5, •.. , 2 -1, 
where 
(6o) h{k) = .! r (.!) r (.!(k+l))/r c.! k+l) = 2 •4 ••• k-3) k-l) . 
2 2 2 2 1 • 3 • • • k-2 k 
Proof: 
Suppose (58) and (59) hold. For given r, s, j, define 
k by k = 2mr + 1 where m = s + j. Then 2-~ = r + 2-s-j, 
- 49 -
2-m(k-2) = r - 2-s-j, and (58) implies terDUise equality of the 
sums in (56). To prove (57), for given re C define m, k by 
s 
m = s and 2-11\c = r. Then by (58) h(k)g(2-m) = g(r). and the 
corresponding terms under the right hand sunmiations in (57) and 
(59) are equal (by (58)). Inequality in (57) follows from 
dropping terms (all positive) beyond j = n - s. Thus (56) and 
(57) hold, and by Theorem 17, these imply (48). Now suppose (48) 
holds, or equivalently (56) and (57) hold. W~ will prove (58) by 
induction on m. 
(61) 
If m = 2 then (56) gives 1 {r = 2) 
¾ g(t) + ½ g(½) = ½(g{fr) + g(½)J or 
which establishes (58) for m = 2. Now suppose (58) holds-for 
m = 2, 3, ..• , m0- 1. We will show it holds also for m = m0 . 
mo -°b 
For any k = 3, 5, ... , 2 - 1, let r = (k-1)2 • Then re C 
s 
where s < m0 • By the induction hypothesis the· summations of (56) 
are equal term by term for s + j < n, that is for all terms except. 
the last. Hence by (56) the last terms are equal. That is, 
This proves (58). The proof of (59) involves.substituting terms 
given by (58). D 
A simple sufficient condition can be given for the condition 
(59) of Theorem 18. For h defined by {6o) we have 
(62) h{2jk-1) k+l k+3 h(k) = k+2 • k+4 
Now suppose that 
••• 
- 50 -
• 
'i 
~ 
i 
... 
u 
I I 
I.., 
.... 
I 
i.. 
I ! 
~ 
i : 
w 
• 
... 
" 
• 
... 
... 
.... 
... 
.. 
.. 
._ 
i.-
-
... 
lal 
._ 
... 
.. 
al 
... 
.. 
'-I 
(63) 
Cl0 
( -m) """' ( -m- j ) g2 >ug2 
- j=l 
m = 1, 2, .... 
Then (62) and (63) imply (59). Thus (58) and (63) are sufficient 
conditions for (48). A further simplification is the restriction 
(64) ( -m-1) 1 ( -m) g2 ~2g2 m = 1, 2' .•. 
which implies (63). This leads us to a particular solution 
obtained by taking equality in (64) for each m. Arbitrarily 
. 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 taking g(2) = 2 we get g(4) = 4 . g~Ji) = 3 • 4, g(-g) = -g, 
3 2 1 5 2 4 1 7 2 4 6 1 1 1 
g(-g) = 3 • 'S' g(-g) = 3 . 5 • E ' g(-g) = 3 • 5 • 7 • 'S' g(TI;). = E' 
etc. 
7. Payoffs which encourage honesty in the limit. 
Consider the case of an infinite sequence of choices. Let 
a= {8tt)~=l where ak = -1 or +1 again represents the fore-
caster's choice at the kth stage. Let H(G, p) be the expected 
payoff for the forecaster with respect to the probability p. We 
can assume p = P(A) is the true probability to be appraised. 
If D is the set defined by (33), then for rt D, 0 < r < 1, 
r defines a unique binary expansion and hence a unique sequence a. 
This sequence is given by 
(65) r - 1 a-2+ 
Cl0 0 2-j-l 
. a 
J=l j 
where r = ra. For re D, there exists two sequences of choices: 
one approaching r from the right and the other approaching r 
from the left. We will say q "encourages honesty in the limit" 
if for all sequences a and B such that p = ra 
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(66) H(Q, p) ~ H(6, p). 
If strict inequality holds in (66) whenever p + r 8 then g 
"strictly encourages honesty in the limit." These definitions 
are analogous to conditions (1) and (2) of Chapter I. 
If for each x e (o, 1) we choose a corresponding G 
satisfying (65) and denote H{G, p) by H(x, p), then H(p, p) 
will satisfy condition (52). Define F and G by (51). Then 
Theorem 15 applies. If (52) holds then since (0, 1) - D is 
dense in (0, 1) and since Theorem 15 implies H is continuous, 
the value of H(p, p) is independent of the choice of Q satis-
fying (65). That is, the forecaster's maximum expectation is 
independent of whether his choices {rk) defined by (30) approach 
r from the right or left for any r c D. 
The functions F, G and H are clearly given by lim F , 
n 
lim G, and lim H respectively on the domain (0, 1) - D. It 
n n 
can be seen that (58), (59) and the existence of lim H {r, p) 
n 
imply (66) or (52). However, there are infinite procedures which 
"encourage honesty in the limit" and do not encourage honesty for 
each n. We consider this class of procedures in this section. 
Define the functions P and Q on re (0, 1) by 
n n 
(67) P (r) = 2n[H(r, r) - H {r+, r)] 
n n 
and 
(68) Q {r) = 2n[H{r, r) - H {r-, r)]. 
n n 
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We will show·(Lemma S) that if g encourages bonesty at the 
nth stage then for all r c (0, 1) 
(69) for all k = 2, 3, ••. , n 
and 
(70) for all k = 2, 3, ••. , n. 
The limiting conditions of (56) and (57) can be expressed by 
(71) 
and 
(72) 
00 
g(r) > 0 g(r-2-s-j) 
j=l 
s = 1, 2, ••• , and 
for all re D 
s 
lim [P (r) - Q (r)] = O a.e. re (o, 1). 
n n 
n-+ co 
The main theorem of this section is Theorem 19 which states these 
limiting conditions are such that g encourages honesty in the 
limit. The proof will be delayed to the end of this section. 
Theorem 19. 
The payoff g encourages honesty in the limit iff (69), (71) 
and (72) hold. 
(71) is also the condition that G (x) be nondecreasing for 
n 
each n. The necessity of this condition is given in Lemma 4. 
Lenuna 4. 
If g encourages honesty in the limit then G (x) 
n 
nondecreasing and F (x) is nonincreasing for all n. 
n 
Proof: 
is 
If (66) holds, then G(x) is nondecreasing, F(x) is non-
increasing, and H(x, x) is continuous, independently of whether 
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right or left continuity for the definitions of 
F {x) and G {x) for x e D. This follows from Theorem 15. 
n n n 
But G (r) = G{r) if right-continuity is chosen 
n n 
and F (r) = F(r) if left-continuity is chosen. This implies 
11 n 
(73) 
is nondecreas·ing and F. is nonincreasing for all n. D 
n 
The condition (69) is the condition that for all x e (0, 1), 
1 H(x, x) - Hn{x, x) ~ 2 [H{x, x) - Hn_1{x, x}]; 
the difference between the limiting H and H isat least halved at each 
n 
stage. Lemma 5 shows this condition is necessary. Let G{l) = G(l-), 
which must be finite if g encourages honesty in the limit. 
Lemma 5. 
If g encourages honesty in the limit then Pn{x) ~ Pn_1{x) 
~ H(x, x) ~ G(l) 
Proof: 
for all x e (o, 1). 
I~ (66) {or (52)) holds then by Lemma 4, (71) holds. Thus 
if {r J is the sequence corresponding to a given r c (0, 1) 
n 
and if left-continuity is assumed for F and G then 
n n 
(74) r g(r) > r 
n n - n 
= H(r, r) - H {r, r) 
n n n n n 
> H(r, r) - H (r, r) 
- n n n n 
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If r > r then (74) gives 
n-
(75) r g(r ) > ~ rkg(rk) + r ~ g(rk). 
n n - ~n+l ~n+l 
If r < r 
n-
then by multiplying both sides of (74) by r/r > 1 we get 
n-
(76) 
(75) and (76) imply 
(77) H (r, r) - H 1{r, r) > H(r, r) - H {r, r). n n- - n 
This implies 
(78) _2(H(r, r) - Hn(r, r))~ H(r, r) - Hn_1(r, r}. 
(78) implies Pn(x) ~ Pn_1(x). P1{x) ~ H(x, x) because g(x) is 
nonnegative. H(x, x) ~ G(l) is obtained from (54) which gives 
for all x e (o, 1), 
1 
(79) H(x, x) = G(l) - f G(x)dx. 0 
(8o) 
(81) 
X 
Define 
P{x) = lim Pn{x) , x e (o, 1) 
n-+ 00 
Q(x) = lim Q (x), x e (0, 1). 
n n .... 00 
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By the Lebesgue convergence theorem, 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
(86) 
1 1 J P(z)dz = lim J Pn{z)dz 
X n-+. oo X 
1 1 J Q(z)dz = lim J Q
0
{z)dz. 
x n-+oox 
Lemma 6. 
If g encourages honesty in the limit then 
1 
H(x, x) = f (P{z) - Q{z) - G(z))dz + G(l). 
X 
Proof: 
H(x, x) = lim H {x, x) 
. n 
n- 00 
= lim ~ (H (y-,y)-H (y+.,y)+H (y+,y) 
n n n 
n .... 00 yeD n[x, 1) 
n 
-H (y.._! -,y+ .!_)) + lim H (1-,1) 
n 2n 2n n n .... 00 
= lim ~ 2 -n( P ( y) -Q ( y )-G ( y+) ) + G ( 1-) 
) n n n n-+ 00 yeonn[x, 1 
1 1 1 
= lim (j Pn{z)dz - j Qn{z)dz - j Gn(z)dz) + G(l-) 
n..,. oo X X X 
1 
= J (P{z) - Q(z) - G{z))dz + G(l-). 
X 
The last equality is given by (82), (83), and G {z) < G{z), 
n -
G {z) .... G{z) as n .... co. 0 
n 
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The necessity of (72) follows from Lemma. 6: (79) and (84) 
1 1 
imply J P(z)dz = J Q(z)dz for all x e (0, 1) and hence 
X X 
P{x) = Q{x) a.e. x e (0, 1). We state this as Lemma 7. 
Lemma 7. 
If g encourages honesty in the:limit then (72) holds, i.e., 
P(x) = Q{x) a.e. x e (0, 1) • 
Proof of Theorem 19: 
We have already shown in Lemmas 4, 5, and 7 that conditions 
(69), (71), and {72) are neces~ary for g to 
encourage honesty in the limit. Therefore we need only prove 
sufficiency. 
Suppose ( 69) , t~71) , . and ( 72) hold. Then, as in Lemma 3, 
(85) and (86) hold. By (71), G is a nonpdecreasing sequence 
n 
of nondecreasing functions and hence 
1 1 
lim J Gn(z)dz = J G(z)dz for all O < x < 1. 
n-t 00 X X 
Clearly by the definitions of p (r) 
n 
and Q {r) 
n 
given in (67) 
and (68), (69) implies (70). Thus, if (69) and (72) hold, 
1 
lim j' (P ( z) - Q ( z) )dz = 0. 
n n 
~ 00 X 
,, 
Therefore G is nondecreasing on O < x < 1 and (54) or the 
equivalent equation (53) holds. Theorem 16 implies (52) holds 
independently of whether right or left-continuity was used in 
defining H(x, x) = lim H (x, x). Therefore (66) holds. 0 
n 
The conditions (69), (71) and (72) could be made less stringent 
in Theorem 19. All that was necessary in the proof was that 
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1 
(87) lim J [Pn(z} - Qn(z)]dz = O for all x e (o, 1) 
n--+ oo X 
and that (71) hold. Pn(r) - Qn(r} is zero if r ~ D, and is 
given by 
(88) 
if r e D ·• Hence the following theorem expresses (66) in terms 
s 
of g. The proof follows from the Lebesgue bounded convergence 
theorem. 
Theorem 20. 
The payoff g encourages honesty in the limit iff (71) and 
(72) hold and IP (z) - Q (z)I n n is uniformly bounded on (0, 1). 
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CHAPTER V 
Miscellaneous Related Problems 
1. Consensus functions. 
The payoff functions studied in this paper were to be given 
to individual forecasters. Other problems arise if the payoffs 
are to be given to a group of fo~ecasters. The forecasters may 
give different answers if they wish to increase the total payoff 
to the group than they would give if they were concerned only 
about their own individual payoff. The forecasters may do better 
as a group if they ·pooled their densities to come up with just 
one average density. 
When there are several forecasters, we need a consensus 
function Q(p1 , p2 , ••• , pn) which gives a density representing 
the group of forecasters. The value of Q might depend on the 
forecasters' estimated densities p1 , p2 , ••• , pn, on a payoff 
function f, on a vector A representing the client's belief about 
the relative expertise of each forecaster, and perhaps on the 
client's own estimated density. 
For simplification, suppose one of the appraised densities 
p1 , p2 , ••• , pn is known to be the true density p. Suppose the 
client has the degree of belief Ak about the event p = pk. Also, 
suppose the client expects to gain H(p, p) = < f(p), p > if p 
is the true density and he assumes it is p, where H(p, p) is 
convex. The client may then wish to choose p to maximize the 
expectation of H(p, p) under the distribution P(p =pk)= Ak. 
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Since 
(89) 
and since f encourages honesty, the client should choose 
p = D..jpr Thus, the client's expected "score" is best if he 
lets Q(p1 , p2 , ••• , pn) = p = !Ajpj. 
Other reasonable definitions can be given for Q. Suppose 
the n forecasters are to be paid ~kf(pk) for their estimates 
pk' k = 1, 2, ••• , n where D..k = 1 and f encourages honesty. 
Then the total payoff to the group is u = D..1f(pi) and is an 
element of the convex set C defined by (28) in Chapter III. If 
u lies 
in the 
at u. 
unless 
* 
on the boundary of 
range of f and take 
However, u will not 
C, we can treat it as though it were 
Q(pl' P2,•••, pn) e p normal to 
usually be on the bqundary of C 
u on the boundary of C 
In general, one can choose a point 
which is "close" to u in some sense 
* 
C 
and then take Q(p1 , p2 , .•. , pn) e P normal to u, if such exists. 
* * For example, one can take u e bdry ( C) such that Jiu - u 11 = 
inf llu - vii. 
v e bdry(C) 
Q(pl' P2,•••, pn) = p. 
* If u = f(p) e C 
The distance 
and C were smooth then 
- uJI can be used 
as a measure of the precision of p1 , p2 , ••• , Pn· It is not 
necessary that II •II be the ~ norm. 
Another means for determining * u is to find a such that 
* Q'U 1 ies on the boundary of C and then take· u = au. Again, 
* at u, if such exists. 
The difficulty with this definition is that the value of Q depends 
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on any constant added to the payoff function. 
Winkler (1968) discusses and compares a number of methods 
for dealing with the consensus problem and presents the results of 
an experiment involving these methods. In an earlier paper, 
Winkler (19671>) gives empirical evidence showing a consensus may 
perform better than any individual • 
2. Other properties of payoffs • 
Because there are several payoffs which encourage honesty, 
one can consider more restrictive properties when making a decision 
about which payoff function to use. In many cases, the logarithmic 
payoff is the only payoff satisfying these more stringent conditions. 
For example, when the dimension of the vector space of random 
variables is finite and at least 3, the logarithmic payoff is the 
only continuous strictly honesty encouraging payoff whose value 
at (p, w) depends only on the value p(w), as already stated 
in Chapter 1. 
Many properties of payoff functions imply the condition of 
dependence only on p(w). For example, as Winkler (1969) stated: 
Since the likelihood used in a Bayesian analysis 
depends on the event which actually occurs, say Xh, and 
not on any other events which do not occur, a scoring 
rule is consistent with the use of likelihoods or log 
likelihoods to evaluate assessors only if the scoring rule 
depends solely on rh. and not on any r. f rh [where rh 
is the assessed probaoility of Xh]. 1 
Another very desirable property of a payoff function f(p)(w) 
is that it is monotone nondecreasing in p(w). This is defined 
by the following condition: 
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(90) f(p)(w) ~ f(q)(w) if p(w) > q(w). · 
If this condition does not hold, then one appraiser could be 
paid more if w c·l occurred than another appraiser who assigned 
a larger likelihood to w. A score or payoff not satisfying (90) 
in the discrete case thus seems unfair. In Euclidean space Rn, this 
condition and continuity imply again the condition of depending only 
on p(w), and hence imply.the logarithmic payoff if f encourages 
honesty and n ~ 3. We state this as Theorem 21, 
Theorem 21. 
Let P = (p: p = (p1 , p2 , ... , p ), 0 <pk< 1, Ep·. = 1}. If n - - J 
f is continuous and monotone nondecreasing in p(w) then f(p)(w) 
is a function only of p(w), where p e P and we l. 
Proof: 
Suppose p, q e P and p(w) = q(w) for fixed we l. Let 
p1 e P and p1(w) + p(w). Without loss of generality, assume 
p1(w) > p(w). Then (90) implies f(~p1+ (1-~)q)(w) ~ f(p)(w) for 
all O < ~ < 1. By letting ~ ~ 0, continuity of f implies 
f ( q )( w) ~ f ( p )( w) • Similarly f ( p )(w) ~ f ( q )( w) • Thus 
f(p)(w) = f(q)(w). D 
Good (1970) suggests that an appropriate logarithmic payoff 
might be A log(q(w)/n(w)) + B where q(w) is the forecaster's 
estimate of p(w) and n(w) is the client's estimate. One 
advantage in the continuous case of this payoff over the logarithm 
of the probability density is that the payoff is invariant under 
a transformation of the variable w. Other properties of the 
- 62 -
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payoff A log(q(w)/n(w)) + B are additivity over independent 
trials of an experiment, and a new concept termed splitativity 
by Good (1970). 
Splitativity in the discrete case is closely related to 
invariance in the continuous case. A payoff is splitative if its 
value is unchanged whenever the kth event is split into two 
events by a known randomizing device. Good (1970) gives a class 
of functions which have the property of splitativity or invariance 
and of encouraging honesty. Good suggests the problem of choosing 
a payoff from this class which "maximizes the forecaster's 
incentive in some sense, but without increasing the 'expected' fee." 
There are appealing properties which could be considered which 
are not shared by the logarithmic payoff, The example given above 
in Chapter 1, due to de Finetti and Savage (1969), where the loss 
L(r, p) = H{p,·p) - H(r, p) is a function only if r - p is one 
such example. Fortunately, the class of honesty encouraging 
payoff functions is large enough to contain functions satisfying 
additional conditions. 
3 • Undominated classes of probability measures • 
The subject of encouraging honesty could be further generalized 
by taking P to be any set of probability measures on a space 
(~, G), not necessarily dominated, and taking t 1 again to be 
the set, defined by (8), of random variables whose expectations 
are defined for every Pe P. 
Let f be a mapping of P into ~- We can use the same 
conditions (1) or (2) as before for f to encourage honesty. Let 
- 63 -
H be a mapping of P into R, and substitute E(f(Q)IP) for 
the inner product in conditions (9), (10), and (11). We could 
make the following definition: 
(91) 
Definition 7. 
* q e t 1 is a subgradient of H at Q e P if for all p e P, 
* * H(P)?: E(q IP) - E(q IQ)+ H(Q). 
In the present context, Theorem 7 is still true,· and the proof 
is the same. * The question of the existence of a subgradient q 
for each Q e P again is a restriction on H. The class P no 
longer is a subset of £. 
4. Symmetrical sequential payoffs. 
In Chapter III, the choice of payoffs at the kth stage was 
given by the choice between the random variables (g(pk), 0) with 
probability vector (p, 1-p) or the random variable (g(pk), 0) 
with probability vector (pk' 1 - pk). This choice was equivalent 
to the choice between the constant payoff 
(92) 
and the payoff 
(93) 
where the distribution of each was given by the probability vector 
(p, 1 - p). 
The reason for using the random payoffs given by (92) and (93) 
was that their expectations were equal only at the point p = pk 
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and hence forced the forecaster to decide whether p;:: pk or 
p ~ pk. There are other payoffs which have this property. They 
are in fact of the form 
(94) Xj = (aj(l-pk), (x-aj)pk} j =·1-or 2. 
The particular payotf defined by x = 0 and a1 = -a2 < 0 
is symmetrical: 
(95) x1 = (a(l-pk}, -apk) 
(96) x2 = (-a( 1-pk), apk) ·, 
We can consider a sequence as described in Chapter III, of choices 
defined by (95) and (96) rather than by (92) and (93). The value 
of a at the k!!:!, stage is allowed to depend on pk. The solution 
to the problem of choosing the function a such that the payoffs 
encourage honesty hopefully will be given in a later paper. 
As mentioned in Section 2 of Chapter I, the class of choices 
at each stage can consist of three or more variables. For example, 
the intervals A(p) c (0, 1) can be sequentially divided by thirds 
rather than halved. The forecaster can be given his choice of the 
three random variables 
x1 = (a(l-pk), -apk) 
x2 = (o, o) 
( ( *) *) * -k-1 X 3 = -a 1-pk , apk , pk = pk+ 3 , a < 0 
at the k~ stage, where it is to be decided if p < pk' pk .:5. p .:5. pk 
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* 
* . 
·or p? pk. ·A general theory might be given ~bout the properties 
of such honesty encouraging increments of hom:a~ty encouraging 
·cumulated payoffs. 
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